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1. Introduction 
On 28th November 2013, the European Commission submitted the “proposal for 
a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of 
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their 
unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure” (the “Commission draft”).1 The 
proposal is part of the Europe 2020 strategy by the Commission, which aims at 
the promotion of business innovation in the European Union. In this regard, the 
Commission also came to the conclusion to strengthen and to harmonize the 
protection of trade secrets against misappropriation on a European level in 
order to ensure the development and exchange of confidential information 
between the Member States.2  
Trade secrets are an important economic factor nowadays.3 They can include 
valuable information for business and research bodies, such as formulas, 
recipes or technical procedures. To keep this information confidential is 
essential, especially in cases where the information does not satisfy the strict 
eligibility requirements of either patents or copyright, the granting of such rights 
may take a long time or the protection under intellectual property laws is not 
affordable.4 Thus, it has been recognized that trade secrets are an increasingly 
important asset in the competitive game.5  
Corresponding to the increased impact of trade secrets, the misappropriation of 
confidential information, especially on cross-border level, has emerged.6 Still, 
the level of protection for trade secrets is not harmonized in the European 
Union.7 In fact, the protection of trade secrets in the Member States differs 
heavily from each other and thereby provides an uneven level safeguards.8 As 
a result of this poor level of protection and the increased risk of 
                                                          
1
 The Commission draft (COM (2013) 813 final) is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/131128_proposal_en.pdf 
(Last Visit: 10.09.2015). 
2
 Cf. Drzewiecki, P. 20; Aplin, P. 2; Gärtner, NZG 2014, 650. 
3
 Cf. Rauer, GRUR-Prax 2014, P. 2; McGuire, GRUR 2015, P. 425. 
4
 Cf. McGuire, GRUR 2015, P. 425. 
5
 Cf. Bronckers/McNelis, P. 2. 
6
 Cf. the Impact Assessment by the European Commission, P. 6, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/131128_impact-
assessment_en.pdf (Last Visit: 10.09.2015).  
7
 Cf. Drzewiecki, P. 20.  
8
 Cf. Ohly, GRUR 2014, P. 2; Rauer, GRUR-Prax 2014, P. 2. 
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misappropriation, the Commission put the preservation of trade secrets on its 
agenda in order to avoid a possible fragmentation of the internal market in this 
area. The result is the above-mentioned proposal. In the meantime, this draft 
was subject to comprehensive discussions by various institutions and authors 
who provided several opinions and amendments. Following the legislative 
process, the Council of the European Union (“the Council”) as well as the 
European Parliament (“the Parliament”) published own revised versions of the 
trade secrets directive.9  
This master thesis will present and analyze the revised draft directive by the 
European Parliament as it constitutes the latest working document in the 
legislative process regarding the introduction of a European directive on the 
protection of trade secrets. This will include, at first, an overview about the 
legislative process of the draft in order to represent the current state of play. 
Following this, the thesis will focus on the substantive and procedural provisions 
laid down in chapters 1 to 3 of the draft directive. In this context, the paper will 
present the particular provisions in more detail and at the same time try to point 
out existing and predictable issues regarding the interpretation and 
implementation of those provisions. Finally, the thesis will discuss aspects that 
are currently missing in the revised draft directive by the Parliament but are 
worth considering. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the master thesis will 
deem trade secrets, in accordance with the prevailing opinion in the Member 
States, not as an intellectual property right but rather as a complementary or 
auxiliary right to intellectual properties.10 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 The Council Draft (Doc. 9870/14) is available at:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/14/st09/st09870.en14.pdf (Last Visit: 10.09.2015); 
The Parliament Draft can be found under: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A8-
2015-0199&language=EN (Last Visit: 10.09.2015). 
10
 The question is highly disputed in the Member States, cf. Saias, P. 721; Baker & Mckenzie, 
“Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market” by, 
MARKT/2011/128/D, P. 1 and 7, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_final-
study_en.pdf (Last Visit: 10.09.2015). 
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2. Legislative process 
The first draft by the Commission was published in November 2013 and 
followed two commissioned studies, the “Study on Trade Secrets and 
Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market”11 and the “Study on 
Trade Secrets and Parasitic Copying (Look-alikes)”12, a Commission 
conference13 and a public online consultation phase.14  
 
After releasing the draft directive, the Commission invited representatives, 
practitioners and institutions all over Europe to give feedback on the announced 
draft. These consultations resulted in several opinions and statements by 
various European and national institutions, such as the European Economic 
and Social Committee15 and the Directorate General for Internal Policies, as 
well as non-governmental institutions, like the Max Planck Institute for 
Innovation and Competition and the International Chamber of Commerce. 
In May 2014, the Council agreed on a general approach for establishing a new 
legal framework for the protection of trade secrets and provided a revised draft 
directive (the "Council Draft").16 This revised draft contained several 
amendments proposed by the General Secretariat of the Council, which were 
discussed and criticized by the above-mentioned institutions. However, the draft 
version was subject to reoccurring critics, especially with regards to the 
protection of fundamental rights and interests. 
Following this, the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (“JURI”) 
approved in June 2015 a draft report by MEP Constance Le Grip and also gave 
their backing to the opening of negotiations on the final text of the directive 
between the Parliament and the Council. Similar to the Council draft, the report 
provides a revised draft version which includes various amendments (the 
                                                          
11
 Ibidem. 
12
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/parasitic/201201-study_en.pdf (Last 
Visit: 10.09.2015).  
13
 “Trade Secrets: Supporting Innovation, Protecting Know-how” Brussels, 29 June 2012. 
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/trade-secrets_en.htm (Last Visit: 
10.09.2015). 
15
 http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.30312 (Last Visit: 10.09.2015). 
16
 Cf. the press release by the Council of the European Union from 26th May 2014 (No. 
10200/14), available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/142780.pdf (Last 
Visit: 10.09.2015). 
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“Parliament Draft”). The next event in the legislative process will be a 1st 
reading on the 24th November 2015.17  
 
3. Analysis of the draft directive 
 
3.1. Objectives 
The directive pursues a wide range of goals. Initiatively, the proposal aims at 
the establishing of an effective and harmonized framework for the protection of 
trade secrets against their unlawful misappropriation within the Member 
States.18  
As it was pointed out before, the rules regarding the protection of trade secret 
are diverging in the Member States. At the moment, the only common 
instrument is provided by Article 39 (2) of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). However, this provision only 
provides minimum standards for the protection of trade secrets. Besides, it is 
unclear to which extend Article 39 (2) TRIPS is currently implemented in the 
national laws of the Member States.19 
Taking this into account, the current national laws in the Member States 
represent a patchwork of differentiating rules, whereby the level as well as the 
method of protection differs essentially.20 With regards to the method of 
protection, several Member States, such as Germany or Austria, have 
incorporated rules on the protection of trade secrets in their unfair competition 
laws. Other countries have implemented rules either in their general tort law, 
their criminal law or intellectual property law. Then again, countries with a 
common-law background, such as the UK or Ireland, rely solely on their case-
law with regards to the breach of confidence-doctrine.21 The only country in the 
                                                          
17
 http://parltrack.euwiki.org/dossier/2013/0402%28COD%29 (Last Visit: 10.09.2015). 
18
 Cf. Saias, P. 723; See also Recital 13. 
19
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 2. 
20
 Cf. Rauer, GRUR-Prax 2014, P.2. 
21
 Cf. Ohly, GRUR 2014, P. 2; Cook, P. 54. 
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EU that has established a specific legal act on trade secrets is Sweden.22 In 
terms of the level of protection, great disparities exist as well. For instance, 
some Member States do not provide a clear definition for trade secrets or do not 
make available appropriate legal remedies and measures in order to stop or 
prevent infringements.23  
The draft directive detects these aspects as great obstacles for providing cross-
border collaborations and innovation in the Internal Market. Pursuant to Recital 
7, these differences in the legal protection lead to a fragmentation of the internal 
market in the area of trade secrets as they lower business incentives to 
undertake innovative related cross-border economic activity, including research 
or manufacturing. Following this, Recital 8 clarifies that it is appropriate to 
provide rules on a European level to approximate the national legislative 
systems in order to ensure a sufficient and consistent level of redress across 
the internal market in case of a trade secret infringement.24   
 
3.2. Structure 
The Parliament draft consists of four chapters. The first chapter includes 
substantive provisions regarding the subject matter and scope of the draft 
directive (Article 1). Furthermore, it provides definitions on common used terms 
in the directive, such as “trade secrets” or “infringing goods” (Article 2). Chapter 
2 of the proposal contains in Article 3 a catalogue of actions that constitute a 
trade secret infringement under the regime of the draft directive, whereby Article 
4 enlists several grounds that may justify a trade secret violation. The third 
chapter (Articles 5 – 14) stipulates remedies, measures and procedures that 
come into play in case of a trade secret infringement. The chapter is separated 
in 3 sections, including in the first section general provisions for the adoption of 
the provided remedies, measures and procedures (Articles 5 to 7) as well as 
specific measures to ensure the confidentiality in legal proceedings (Article 8), 
followed by provisional and precautionary measures in section 2 (Articles 9 and 
                                                          
22
 Act on the Protection of Trade Secrets (1990:409), available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129537 (Last Visit: 10.09.2015).  
23
 Cf. Drzewiecki, P. 23; See also Recitals 4 and 5.  
24
 In the following discourse, the term “trade secrets Infringement” will refer to the unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure as described in Article 3.  
6 
 
10) and measures resulting from a decision of the merits of the case in section 
3 (Article 11 and 12). The draft closes in chapter 4 with final regulations on 
sanctions (Article 15) and monitoring and reporting duties regarding the 
transposition of the directive (Article 16 and 17).  
 
3.3. Substantive provisions  
 
3.3.1. Subject matter and scope - Article 1 
Pursuant to Article 1 (1) of the Parliament draft,25 the directive lays down rules 
on the protection against the unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of 
undisclosed know-how and commercial business information (trade secrets). In 
this regard, the provision refers to terms that are regulated in more detail in 
Articles 2 and 3. Besides this general provision in paragraph 1, Article 1 
contains further provisions in paragraphs 2 and 3 in order to define the scope 
and subject matter of the directive.  
 
3.3.1.1. Exempted areas 
Article 1 (2) includes a catalogue of aspects that shall not be affected by the 
draft directive. This comprises, inter alia, the freedom and pluralism of the 
media as enshrined in Article 11 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (lit. 
a), the use of information, knowledge, experience and skills honestly acquired 
by employees in the normal course of their previous employment, or in some 
other contractual relationship, which are not covered by the definition of a trade 
secret as provided for in Article 2 (1) of the proposal (lit. d) as well as the 
autonomy of social partners and their rights to enter into collective-agreements 
(lit. e), the obligations of the Member States to ensure effective protection 
against unfair competition (lit. f) and the rules of criminal law in the Member 
States (lit. g).  
                                                          
25
 Articles and Recitals that are named in the following discourse and do not contain a statutory 
description are those of the draft directive in the version provided by the European Parliament. 
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The paragraph was added in the current draft version and clarifies the scope of 
the directive in further detail. Apparently, some provisions seem to be a reaction 
to the reoccurring criticism by journalists and other institutions that came up 
since the original draft by the Commission was released.26 These critics feared, 
inter alia, that the directive would restrict the freedom of expression and 
information too much.27 In this regard, the provision can be regarded as clear 
signal that the protection of fundamental rights and other interests is recognized 
by the proposal.  
 
3.3.1.2. Cases of lawful acquisition 
Article 1 (3) enlists in subparagraph 1 several ways when the acquisition of a 
trade secret shall be considered lawful. This includes that the trade secret was 
obtained by independent discovery or creation (lit. a), by observation, study, 
disassembly or testing of a product or object that has been made available to 
the public or that it is lawfully in the possession of the acquirer of the information 
who is free from any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret 
(b), by exercise of the right of workers or workers' representatives to information 
and consultation in accordance with Union and national law and/or practices (lit. 
c) or any other practice which, under the circumstances, is in conformity with 
honest commercial practices (lit. d).  
 
3.3.1.2.1. Systematical position  
The catalogue was originally incorporated in Article 4 (1). Then again, the 
exceptions and justification grounds, which are now laid down in Article 4 (1), 
were formerly regulated in paragraph 2. Taking this into account, it seems that 
the European legislator wanted to point out a priorization of the cases that are 
now laid down in Article 1 (3). However, as Article 3 regulates the unlawful 
                                                          
26
 Cf. JURI, “Trade secrets: freedom of expression must be protected, say legal affairs MEPs”; 
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/news-
room/content/20150615IPR66493/html/Trade-secrets-freedom-of-expression-must-be-
protected-say-legal-affairs-MEPs (Last Visit: 10.09.2015).  
27
Cf.  Euobserver, “EU trade bill threatens media freedom”; available at: 
https://euobserver.com/opinion/129103 (Last Visit: 10.09.2015). 
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acquisition, use and disclosure of trade secrets and the current Article 4 deals 
with exceptions and justification grounds in case of such an infringement, it 
seems more consistent to place Article 1 (3) between those two provisions 
(again), because it also concerns primarily the question whether a trade secret 
is infringed or not.  
 
3.3.1.2.2. Reverse engineering 
One of the most disputed elements concerns the lawfulness of a trade secret 
acquisition in case of reverse engineering, which is covered by Article 1 (3) lit. 
b). In general, the provision is welcomed. This derives from the fact that, even 
though most of the Member States allow the practice of reverse engineering, 
the concrete requirements differ from each other.28 In order to avoid these legal 
diversities a harmonized regulation seems to be inevitable. However, the 
provision still raises certain concerns. 
Contrary to the original Commission draft, the provision now explicitly requires 
that the acquirer, who is in possession of the information, must be free from any 
legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret. This clause was 
added in the current draft and clarifies that trade secret holders can limit the 
reverse engineering by establishing adequate contractual duties.29 Although this 
does not apply when the object in question has been made available, it enables 
trade secret holders at least to restrict reverse engineering in cases where 
contractual relationships are established.  
Another issue concerns the question whether the provision in question also 
allows the subsequent use or exploitation of a trade secret after being obtained 
via reverse engineering or is only limited to the previous acquisition. Article 1 (3) 
lit. b) only mentions several ways how to obtain a trade secret, such as 
observation, study or testing but it does not explicitly allow or prohibit the 
subsequent use of trade secret. According to Harte-Bavendamm and Kalbfus, 
the directive does not only recognize the acquisition but also the subsequent 
                                                          
28
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 35.  
29
 The requirement that the duty needs to be “legally valid” indicates that the provision only 
means contractual duties. 
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use and exploitation of a trade secret which was previously obtained via reverse 
engineering.30 This seems convenient because otherwise the practical 
relevance of reverse engineering would be too limited and Article 1 (3) lit. b) 
rather meaningless. However, taking into consideration that the subsequent use 
shall be covered by the directive, it must be questioned whether this use must 
be limited by adequate rules.  
Currently, the directive misses out to provide adequate restrictions regarding 
the use of trade secrets that were obtained by reverse engineering.31 This might 
be crucial especially in those sectors where no intellectual property protection is 
available but the trade secrets can be decoded easily by reverse engineering.32 
Without adequate restrictions in this matter, further investments and 
developments of new products could be prevented and thereby contradict the 
aims of the directive to foster business and innovation in the Internal Market.33 
The draft directive recognizes these dangers in Recital 10a as well, which 
explicitly mentions in the following that the innovators and creators can be 
nowadays the victim of parasitic copying or slavish imitations. Following this, it 
is essential to implement further criteria and safeguards to limit the subsequent 
use.34 Such criteria could include, inter alia, the requiring of a specific purpose. 
In this regard, it would be thinkable to limit reverse engineering to the effect that 
only such practices should be legitimate which aim at the creation of a further 
development or an aberration of the reverse engineered product.35 Of course, 
this would require the evaluation of further criteria in order to classify when such 
an advanced product would be achieved.   
 
                                                          
30
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 455; See also Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of 
the Max Planck Institute, Para. 35 who come to the same conclusion. 
31
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 455; Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max 
Planck Institute, Para. 37. 
32
 See Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 37 who name as an 
example the cosmetic industry.  
33
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 37 
34
 It is noteworthy that recital 10a indicates the need for such restriction as well. However, it 
does not state how these limitations could like but refers the issue to the Commission in order to 
examine the need for Union actions in this field.  
35
  For a corresponding “purpose-bound” approach, see Article 6 in the Software Directive 
2009/24/EC which also limits the decompilation of software “to obtain the information necessary 
to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs”. See also Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 455 who tend to provide a 
similar approach.  
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3.3.1.2.3. Honest commercial practices 
Lastly, Article 1 (3) lit. d) stipulates that any other practice which is in conformity 
with honest commercial practices shall be regarded lawful. The term "honest 
commercial practices" was adopted from Article 39 (2) TRIPS and is used 
repetitively in the draft directive (see Article 3 (2) lit. f). The systematical position 
as well as the wording indicate that the provision functions as a catchall-
regulation in case the previous listed cases are not relevant. Thereby, the use 
of a loose term like “honest commercial practices” is reasonable, because it 
provides a flexible way to react on new, maybe yet unknown situations. 
Unfortunately, the directive does not provide further guidance on the 
interpretation of this term. Thus, the subsumption of new or unknown cases 
under this term appears to be difficult in the future. Taking this into account, it 
will be up to the competent courts to establish case-groups. These will have to 
orientate themselves on the previous mentioned cases, laid down in lit. a) to c), 
in order to provide a certain comparability and to not extend the scope of the 
provision.36 In order to avoid legal uncertainty and inconsistent interpretations in 
the Member States, the European legislator should nevertheless provide at 
least further exemplarily guidance. 
 
3.3.1.2.4. Lawfulness in case of Union or national law 
Following the lawfulness of the acquisition in subparagraph 1, Article 1 (3) 
subparagraph 2 recognizes that the acquisition as well as the use and 
disclosure shall be considered lawful if such actions are required or allowed by 
Union or national law, without prejudice to any other duty not to disclose the 
trade secret or to limit its use that may be imposed by Union or national law. 
Contrary to subparagraph 1 (see above), this provision covers also the use and 
disclosure of trade secrets. This is reasonable, because it appears to be 
inadequate to consider only the acquisition of a trade secret as lawful in specific 
cases. Still, the wording seems in its current form rather broad. It enables the 
European and the national legislators to establish corresponding rules regarding 
the lawfulness of the acquisition, use and disclosure of trade secrets without 
                                                          
36
 Arguing in the same direction: Gärtner, NZG 2014, P. 651. 
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laying down any conditions or safeguards. This should be the case in order to 
avoid too diverging legal frameworks as well as to avoid that the rules in the 
directive against the unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure could be easily 
circumvented.  
 
3.3.2. Definition of key terms - Article 2 
Article 2 provides definitions for the terms “trade secret”, “trade secret holder”, 
“infringer” and “infringing goods”. These expressions are repetitively used in the 
draft directive. Thereby, the definitions of those terms will allow a better 
understanding and harmonization of the rules in the draft directive.  
 
3.3.2.1. Trade secret 
According to paragraph 1, a trade secret means know-how and business 
information which is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or 
readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind 
of information in question (lit. a), has commercial value because it is secret (lit. 
b) and has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret (lit. c).  
 
3.3.2.1.1. Know-how and business information  
Following this, the definition is based to a large extend on the definition of 
Article 39 (2) TRIPS. One aberration in the proposal concerns the terms “know-
how” and “business information”, which were added, in contrast to TRIPS and 
the original draft by the Commission, to the original “information” requirement.  
Taking this amendment into account, it appears that the current wording of the 
provision (“a trade secret means know-how and business information…”) 
stipulates an additional step in the overall assessment whether a trade secret is 
existent. In this case, it would be required to evaluate at first whether the 
12 
 
information in question constitutes know-how or business information.37 Only 
then, it could be evaluated whether these information fulfill the further criteria 
laid down in Article 2 (1) lit. a) to c).  
This causes several concerns. At first, it seems conflicting because the draft 
directive does not provide a definition of the terms “know-how” and “business 
information”. Secondly, the terms “know-how” and “business information” are 
often used as synonyms for trade secrets.38 The formulation in Article 1 (1) 
indicates the same understanding. Thereby, it is not reasonable to use these 
terms as a requirement for a trade secret. Following this, the European 
legislator should delete the terms know-how and business information in Article 
2 and refer only to basic requirement of “information”. 
In this regard it is also noteworthy that the draft directive should provide a 
uniform terminology in order to describe or define trade secrets. In particular, 
the draft directive explicitly names in Recital 8 technical information as to be 
covered by trade secrets as well. Thereby, the proposal should recognize such 
information as a part of trade secrets equally to know-how and business 
information. 
 
3.3.2.1.2. Commercial value 
Besides the requisite of being secret,39 Article 2 (1) requires that the information 
in question has commercial value.40 Recital 8 clarifies that it is sufficient that the 
information in question has actual or potential commercial value in order to fulfill 
the requirement of Article 2 (1) lit. b). The implementation of potential value is 
reasonable because it allows the protection of information as a trade secret in 
such cases where it is not determinable - due to the early point of development 
                                                          
37
 This is also indicated by Recital 8 which states that a definition for trade secrets should be 
construed to cover business information, technological information and know-how. 
38
 Cf. McGuire, GRUR 2015, P. 425; See also Fn. 20 in the Impact Assessment by the 
European Commission which explicitly states that “trade secrets are often referred to as 
“confidential business information”, “(secret) know-how”, “proprietary information/technology”, 
“undisclosed information”, “business secrets”, etc.”.  
39
 Cf. Article 2 (1) lit. a) 
40
 Cf. Article 2 (1) lit. b). 
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or adoption - whether the information in question may already have actual 
commercial value but it can be surely assumed that it will have.  
The current version of the draft now also explicitly states that trivial information 
are excluded from the protection in the directive.41 This includes, inter alia, ideal 
secrets which are protected as a part of personality. As Recital 28 explicitly 
mentions that the application of any other relevant law in other areas, including 
privacy, shall not be affected by the directive, it is consistent that ideal secrets 
shall not fall under the scope of protection by the draft directive.42 
 
3.3.2.1.3. Reasonable steps 
Lastly, the information needs to be “subject to reasonable steps under the 
circumstances [...] to keep it secret”. The directive does not provide any 
guidance on the question which kind of steps should be taken in order to be 
reasonable. In general, it is convincing that this element covers either factual 
measures (such as safekeeping in a vault or encryption) or contractual 
agreements in order to keep the information secret.43 In this regard, the level of 
reasonable steps might change due to the specific circumstances of the case. 
Apparently, this will require a case-by-case evaluation, whereby the range of 
steps can include either simple instructions as well as complex mechanisms. 
Another question that arises is whether the provision always requires the 
adoption of reasonable steps or may allow the absence of such as well. This is 
interesting in situations where it is evident that the information is confidential but 
no explicit measures were taken. The wording does not deny such 
interpretation.44 In fact, the provision can be interpreted to the effect that under 
the circumstances of the specific case reasonable measures might be 
expendable.  
 
                                                          
41
 See Recital 8.  
42
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 454. 
43
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 20; Kalbfus/Harte-
Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 454. 
44
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 454. 
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3.3.2.1.4. Knowledge honestly acquired by employees 
Pursuant to the last subparagraph in Article 2 (1), experience and skills honestly 
acquired by employees in the normal course of their employment shall not be 
considered as a trade secret. The rule was amended in the Parliament version 
in order to provide a better workers' mobility.45 Even though this goal is 
welcomed, it can cause serious problems regarding the distinction whether 
specific confidential information must be considered as experiences and skills 
acquired by a (former) employee or as a trade secret. In practice, this 
differentiation might be very hard to find.46 Unfortunately, the draft directive 
does not provide any guidance how to draw this differentiation. Thereby, the 
European legislator should clarify in the recitals how to accomplish this 
distinction in order to provide legal certainty.  
 
3.3.2.2. Infringing goods 
The definition for the term “infringing goods” in Article 2 (4) was also subject to 
several changes in the revised Parliament draft. Pursuant to this provision, the 
term “infringing goods” means goods whose conception, characteristics, 
functioning, manufacturing process or marketing significantly benefits from trade 
secrets unlawfully acquired, used or disclosed.  
The criteria “conception”, “characteristics” and “functioning were added in the 
current draft version, whereby the former terms “design” and “quality” were 
deleted. The decision is reasonable, because the former terms could be 
connected to goods in very different ways and allowed a broad application of 
the provision. The same concerns still apply to the terms “manufacturing 
process” and “marketing”, because these expressions are not directly 
connected to the good itself but rather constitute a precursor (in case of 
manufacturing process) or follow-up to the production of a certain good (in case 
                                                          
45
 Cf. Recital 27a which clarifies that the directive should not affect the freedom of movement for 
workers. 
46
 Cf. Out-Law.com, “MEPs back changes to proposed EU trade secrets rules”, available under: 
www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/june/meps-back-changes-to-proposed-eu-trade-secrets-
rules/ (Last Visit: 10.09.2015). 
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of marketing).47 Thereby, these elements seem to be out of place as well. 
Taken this into account, the affected terms should be removed from the draft. 
On the other hand, the newly added criteria are welcomed, because they allow 
the inclusion of several aspects that are directly attributed to the good itself then 
the form quality-criterion.48  
Still in question is the understanding of the element of a “significant benefit”. 
Even though the criterion of a significant benefit indicates that a certain degree 
must be reached, the directive does not provide when such a degree should be 
accomplished in order to provide that a good significantly benefits from a trade 
secret infringement.49 In case that the European legislator will not provide 
further guidance on the interpretation of the criterion, it will be up to the 
competent courts to decide in the concrete case when such degree might be 
fulfilled or not.  
 
3.3.2.3. Interim conclusion 
Taking this previous remarks into account, it can be stated that the provision 
already provides a sufficient basis to define the most common terms in the 
proposal. Especially, the close alignment of the trade secret definition to the 
rules in Article 39 (2) TRIPS allows a homogenous interpretation of both legal 
frameworks. However, the European legislator should take up the above-
mentioned concerns in order to provide further clarification.  
 
3.3.3. Unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of trade 
secrets - Article 3 
Article 3 (1) obliges the Member States to provide the holder of a trade secret 
with civil law protection against the unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of a 
trade secret in order to prevent or to obtain redress for those infringements. 
                                                          
47
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 22; in the same direction 
see: Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 454. 
48
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 23. 
49
 In the same direction, see Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 454.   
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Following this general obligation, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3 list several 
cases in which the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret shall be 
regarded unlawful.  
 
3.3.3.1. Unlawful acquisition 
Article 3 (2) comprises several cases in which the acquisition of a trade secret 
shall be considered unlawful. This requires primarily that the trade secret was 
acquired without the consent of the trade secret holder. Following this, the 
unauthorized access to or copy of any documents, objects, materials, 
substances or electronic files which contain the trade secret or from which the 
trade secret can be deduced constitute a trade secret infringement when those 
things were lawfully under the control of the trade secret holder.50 Further cases 
include theft, bribery or deception51 as well as the breach or inducement to 
breach a confidentiality agreement or any other duty to maintain secrecy.52 
Lastly, any other conduct which can be considered, under the circumstances, 
contrary to honest commercial practices can represent a trade secret 
infringement.53 
 
3.3.3.1.1. Removal of fault elements 
At first, it is noteworthy that the current draft of the provision does not require 
anymore any elements of fault.54 Thereby, one of the biggest controversies 
regarding the wording of the provision was sufficiently amended.55 This decision 
is to be welcomed, because elements of fault regularly play a role only with 
regards to damages,56 whereby the assessment of a breach of duty or of legal 
interest must be separated from the question of fault. Such an amalgamation of 
                                                          
50
 Article 3 (2) lit. (a).  
51
 Article 3 (2) lit. (b) to (d). 
52
 Article 3 (2) lit. (e); a further analysis of this regulation is provided in Chapter 3.3.3.4 of thesis. 
53
 Article 3 (2) lit. (f). 
54
 Cf. Article 3 (2) of the Commission draft which required that the acquisition was carried out 
intentionally or with gross negligence.  
55
 See inter alia: Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P.454; Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments 
of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 27.  
56
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 27. 
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both elements is now avoided. Furthermore, the decision is also a huge benefit 
for a trade secret holder who applies for injunctions or corrective measures, 
because he or she would is not obliged anymore to provide evidence in order to 
prove the (sometimes difficult) question of fault on the side of the infringer.  
 
3.3.3.1.2. Reference to criminal law terms 
Another aspect affects the reference to terms with criminal law connotations in 
Articles 3 (2) lit. (b) to (d). The laid down offences are not harmonized in the 
Member States, whereby the notion could be interpreted in an inconsistent 
manner within the different Member States.57 Another problem in this regard 
derives from the fact that those notions regularly require elements of fault as 
well. As it was mentioned before, such elements should be excluded from the 
question if a trade secret infringement is present. In order to avoid the above-
named concerns different terms should be amended in the directive by using 
neutral and objectified terms.58 The Max Planck Institute proposed the 
incorporation of terms like “taking of documents” or “procurement of information 
through deception” as well as “other unlawful means”.59 Another solution would 
be the deletion of the actions laid down in lit. b) to d) and the amendment of the 
general term “appropriation” in lit. a) in order to provide an additional act that 
could cover the actions in question.60 In case that the term “unauthorized” does 
would cover deceptive actions, this term could also be incorporated in lit. a).  
 
3.3.3.2. Unlawful use or disclosure  
Article 3 (3) of the draft directive lays down cases where the use or disclosure of 
a trade secret shall be considered unlawful. Like in the previous paragraph, the 
provision requires as a precondition the missing consent by the trade secret 
holder. In addition, the unlawful acquisition of a trade secret (lit. a), the breach 
                                                          
57
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 28.  
58
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 454.  
59
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 29. 
60
 See a similar proposal in the draft of the Council which amended the wording in Article 3 (2) 
lit. a) by adding the term “appropriation” as a further possibility of an unlawful acquisition and 
deleting the cases laid down in Articles 3 (2) lit. (b) to (d).  
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of a legally valid confidentiality agreement or any other duty maintain secrecy of 
the trade secret (lit. b) as well as the breach of a legally valid contractual or any 
other duty to limit the use of the trade secret (lit. c) can constitute an unlawful 
use or disclosure in the sense of paragraph 3. The last two variants cover cases 
where the trade secret was obtained in a lawful way but was used or disclosed 
in breach of a certain duty.  
Like Article 3 (2), the Parliament draft removed any elements of fault in 
paragraph 3. This is consistent as the above mentioned arguments apply here 
as well.  
 
3.3.3.3. Exceptions for experience and skills honestly 
acquired by employees 
Pursuant to Article 3 (3a), paragraph 3 does not provide any ground to trade 
secret holders to limit the use of experience and skills honestly acquired by 
employees in the normal course of their employment or add any restriction for 
employees to occupy a new position, to those provided for in their employment 
contract, in compliance with relevant Union and national law.  
The paragraph was added in the current draft version by the Parliament to 
ensure that the use of knowledge by a (former) employee does not fall under 
the scope of Article 3 (3) lit. b) and c).61 This aspect plays a substantial role in 
the mobility of former employees because obtained knowledge very often 
constitutes an important professional asset. Thus, the restriction by a former 
employer to use or disclose such knowledge could limit the employee 
significantly in finding or establishing a new occupation. Taking this into 
account, the provision connects with the regulation laid down in Article 2 (1) 
subparagraph 2 which also aims at the protection of labor mobility.62 
 
 
                                                          
61
 See the critics to the original draft by Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, 
Para. 32.  
62
 See Chapter 3.3.2.1.4.  
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3.3.3.4. Secondary violations  
Pursuant to Article 3 (4), the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret by a 
third party shall be considered unlawful whenever he or she knew or should 
have known under the circumstances at the time of the acquisition (by him or 
her) that the trade secret was obtained from another person who was using or 
disclosing the trade secret unlawfully within the meaning of paragraph 3. 
Basically, this covers so-called “secondary infringements”, where the trade 
secret is obtained by a third party (or second acquirer) from a person who has 
previously acquired the trade secret unlawfully.63 In contrast to the unlawful acts 
laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3, this provision contains elements of fault. This 
is reasonable because the liability is here extended to third parties in case of 
secondary actions. In this regard, the additional fault element provides to limit 
the scope of such secondary infringements and to differentiate these violations 
from direct infringements.64   
Taking this into account, it would be consistent to include the unlawful 
acquisition of a trade secret carried out in breach of a confidentiality agreement 
or other duty to maintain secrecy, laid down in Article 3 (2) lit e), into Article 3 
(4). Paragraph 2 covers situations where the trade secret has been obtained by 
a person before and is now acquired in breach of a confidentiality agreement by 
a third party.65 Thus, this kind of violation can be regarded as secondary 
infringement, similar to those that are already regulated in paragraph 4. As a 
consequence, the variant would have to require the presence of fault as well. 
 
3.3.3.5. Actions with regard to infringing goods 
Article 3 (5) includes unlawful acts with regards to infringing goods. According to 
this provision, this includes the production, offering or placing on the market of 
infringing goods as well as the import, export or storage of those goods for the 
                                                          
63
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 454; Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max 
Planck Institute, Para. 29. 
64
 See also footnote 10 to Article 39 TRIPS which requires in case of the acquisition of 
undisclosed information by third parties the provision of knowledge or gross negligence in failing 
to know.   
65
 Whereby cases where a trade secret is used or disclosed in breach of a confidentiality 
agreement fall under the scope of Article 3 (3) lit. b). 
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first mentioned purposes. Contrary to the original draft by the Commission, the 
new draft version also requires now that the person engaging in the described 
activity was or - depending on the circumstances - should have been aware of 
the fact that unlawful use had been made of the trade secret within the meaning 
of paragraph 3.  
The acts listed in Article 3 (5) can be regarded as a form of secondary or 
indirect infringement as well, as they build on a prior violation of a trade secret. 
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to hold third parties liable only in 
case of fault. Otherwise, this would allow a too broad legal responsibility in such 
cases.  
According to the wording, the awareness must be related to the unlawful 
acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret by the first infringer. However, 
the directive does not provide any date when this requirement must be provided 
by the engaging person. Thereby, it can be concluded that it does not matter 
whether the person in question was aware of the primary infringement before, 
during or after engaging in one of those activities laid down in paragraph 5. This 
is consistent, because the covered activities (primarily) constitute continuous 
actions that take place over some period. In this case, it would be inequitable to 
make the liability dependent on a specific date, for example the beginning of the 
activity in question, because it would be mostly a coincidence whether the 
person engaging in those activities would be aware of the previous infringement 
before or after this date.      
Other issues concern the interpretation of the terms "import" and "export". For 
instance, the directive does not define these terms in further detail and does not 
provide guidance whether these terms cover only trade with third countries or 
also intra-Community trade. In this regard, it seems convincing that the 
provision should only cover trade with third countries. Otherwise the field of 
application of the term “offering and placing on the market” could be obsolete or 
at least limited.66 Still, this should be clarified in the directive in order to avoid a 
long-lasting preliminary ruling procedure by the CJEU.  
                                                          
66
 Pointing in the same direction: Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 
34. 
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Unlike some authors in the literature, it does not appear to be necessary to 
clarify the provision to the effect that it does not apply in case of the import or 
export of infringing goods for the personal use or consumption. In fact, it is 
convincing that "the mere use of goods that benefit from infringement of trade 
secrets is not a violation in itself".67 However, by requiring that the import, the 
export or the storage of infringing goods has to take place for the purpose of 
producing, placing or offering of these goods on the market, the provision 
already seems to have a sufficient criterion to exclude the personal use or 
consumption.68  
 
3.3.3.6. Interim conclusion 
All in all, the provisions laid down in Article 3 are welcomed and provide a 
consistent regulation. The establishing of a catalogue of pre-defined actions, 
which constitute an infringement under the regime of the draft directive, 
provides a conclusive basis for the remedies, measures and procedures laid 
down in the third chapter of the proposal. In this context, it also constitutes a 
significant advantage towards the Enforcement Directive. The latter does not 
incorporate a similar catalogue of defined violation forms, but only refers to the 
general term of "infringing activities" (see for example Article 13). Thus, the draft 
directive provides a much easier and precise application of the remedies, 
measures and procedures laid down in the draft directive.69  
Due to the removal of the fault elements in paragraph 1 as well as the adoption 
of rules regarding the use of experience and skills acquired by employees the 
level of protection will be raised as well. However, as it was pointed out before, 
the provision still offers enough room for further improvements. 
 
 
                                                          
67
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 34. 
68
 For a different opinion see: Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 34. 
69
 It is noteworthy that this also applies to regulation of exceptions and justifications, laid down 
in Articles 1 (3) and 4, as the Enforcement directive does not incorporate any exculpation 
grounds, see Metzger, P. 6. 
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3.3.4. Exceptions - Article 4 
Article 4 contains a catalogue of exceptions when the alleged infringement of a 
trade secret can be justified. In this case, the measures, procedures and 
remedies provided in this directive do not apply.  
 
3.3.4.1. Freedom of expression and information 
Article 4 lit. (a) covers the case that the alleged violation was carried out for 
making legitimate use in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union of the right to freedom of expression and information, 
including media freedom. The aim behind this provision is to ensure a stronger 
protection of journalistic work, in particular with regards to investigative 
research, protection of sources and the right of the public to be informed. This is 
undermined by Recital 12b which explicitly states that it is essential to respect 
the freedom of the press and the media, as enshrined in Article 11 (2) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
 
3.3.4.2. Revelation of misconduct  
Article 4 lit (b) concerns the case that the alleged violation of a trade secret was 
carried out for revealing a misconduct, wrongdoing, fraud or illegal activity, 
provided that the respondent acted in the public interest. As Recital 12a 
clarifies, the provision aims at the protection of whistleblowing activities.70  
In contrast to the original draft by the Commission, the wording of the provision 
was significantly amended. Initially, the original draft by the Commission 
required that the alleged trade secret infringement was carried out for the 
purpose of revealing the above named activities. The current draft dispenses 
the purpose criterion and only requires that the respondent acted in the public 
interest.71 Following this, it is conceivable that the scope of the provision will be 
                                                          
70
 Cf. Recital 12a which was amended in the current draft version. 
71
 In this regard, it is probable that the criterion of “acting in the public interest” only constitutes 
an objective criterion and does not require any purpose of the respondent to act in this interest.  
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expanded in favor of whistleblowers who were acting with just a subsidiary or 
even without a primarily intent to reveal a certain misconduct. All in all, this 
decision is welcomed, because it gives whistleblowers a broader possibility to 
find protection under the provision even if they decide later on to reveal the 
misconduct.  
 
3.3.4.3.  Disclosure by workers to their representatives 
In case that the trade secret was disclosed by workers to their representatives, 
Article 4 lit. c) permits such action if it was part of the legitimate exercise of their 
representative functions in accordance with Union and national law, provided 
that such disclosure was necessary for that exercise. 
The provision intends to protect workers as well as to ensure the function of 
worker representatives due to the fact that the disclosure of trade secrets can 
cause serious conflicts in the execution of representative's functions. This 
seems to be significant, especially in those cases where the representatives 
have consultation or information duties.  
 
3.3.4.4. Protection of legitimate interests 
Lastly, Article 4 lit. (e) allows the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret 
if they were carried out for the purpose of protecting a general public interest or 
any other legitimate interest, recognized by Union or national law and through 
judicial practice. 
Following up the adoption of those terms in other directives of the European 
Union as well as the systematical place, it is most likely that Article 4 lit. e) is 
intended to function as a general stipulation that catches those cases that do 
not fall under the cases laid down in Article 4 lit. a) to c), but should be excluded 
from the liability regime of the draft directive. In this regard, it is understandable 
that the directive does not provide any definition for the terms of a "general 
public interest" or "other legitimate interests". This allows a broad interpretation 
and field of application. However, it will be up to the Member States and the 
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competent courts to substantiate these criterions on the basis of upcoming 
cases.  
 
3.3.4.5. Interim conclusion 
Article 4 enlists appropriate cases where the infringement of a trade secret 
might be justified. Thereby, the interests of involved third parties, such as 
journalists or whistleblowers, are properly safeguarded. However, it must be 
pointed out that directive should not exclude the interests of trade secret 
holders. At the moment, the wording rather gives the impression that the listed 
grounds per-se justify an infringement. This would however constitute a too 
strict priorization in favor of the affected third parties at the expense of trade 
secret holders. Especially the broad wording of Article 4 lit. b) can cause serious 
conflicts with the interests of trade secret holders. Thereby, the directive should 
clarify in more detail that the laid down cases do not constitute per-se a 
justification but still require a balance with the interests of the trade secret 
holder.72 
 
3.4. Measures, remedies and procedures 
Chapter 3 of the draft directive incorporates provisions on measures, 
procedures and remedies in case of a trade secret infringement.  
 
3.4.1. General provisions - Articles 5 and 6 (1) 
In this regard, Article 5 (1) stipulates a general obligation for the Member States 
to provide measures, procedures and remedies in order to ensure the 
availability of civil redress against the unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of 
trade secrets. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 5, these provided measures 
need to fulfill certain criteria, inter alia, being fair and equitable (lit. a), not 
unnecessarily complicated or costly (lit. b), effective and dissuasive (lit. c). 
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 Cf. Gärtner, NZG 2014, P. 651. 
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Following, Article 6 (1) obliges the competent judicial authorities to apply the 
measures, procedures and remedies provided for in the draft directive in a 
manner that is proportionate (lit. a), avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade, competition and worker mobility (lit. b) and provides safeguards against 
their abuse (lit. c).  
 
3.4.2. Abuse of litigation - Article 6 (2) 
Article 6 (2) lays down several measures that can be taken by the competent 
judicial authorities in case a claim concerning a trade secret infringement is 
manifestly unfounded and the applicant acted abusively or in bad faith. This 
includes the imposing of sanctions (lit. a) and/or dissemination of the 
information concerning the decision (lit. b).73 
The rationale behind the provisions is to deter the application of unjustified and 
abusive claims.74 However, it can still be questioned whether such a provision is 
legitimate in the context of trade secret protection. According to Harte-
Bavendamm such sanctions are not necessary, because there is no higher risk 
of abusive lawsuits in trade secret proceedings compared to other fields of law, 
especially intellectual property cases.75 However, it is evident that alone the 
accusation in an unjustified infringement proceeding can intimidate a party or 
can have negative effects on the reputation, resulting inter alia in the loss of 
business contacts or difficulties to entry a certain market.76 Furthermore, the 
legal proceedings may cause great costs. Taking into account that trade secrets 
are part or at least related to unfair competition law which aims at the controlling 
of market behavior, provisions like those in question seem appropriate in a 
trade secret context as well.77  
Besides this general concern, Article 6 (2) of the draft directive causes further 
questions regarding the interpretation and implementation. At first, the draft 
directive does not provide clear guidelines which sanctions are covered by 
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 Article 6 (2) lit. b) refers to Article 14.  
74
 In order to ensure a smooth functioning of the internal market, See Recital 12. 
75
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 456. 
76
 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 41. 
77
 See also national provisions like Section 8 of the German Unfair Competition Law (UWG), 
which provides similar measures in case of abusive lawsuits. 
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Article 6 (2) lit. a).78 The only explicitly mentioned sanction is the publication of 
the decision (lit. b), whereas the imposing of sanctions is left to national law. 
According to Kefferpütz, the incorporation of sanctions is contributed to the lack 
of cost reimbursement in case an action is dismissed in several Member 
States.79 In favor of such an approach speaks that Article 6 (2) does not refer - 
unlike other provisions in the directive - to the term of compensation. However, 
in that case it would seem to be more preferable to establish a provision similar 
to Article 14 of the Enforcement Directive, which covers the bearing of costs on 
a general level and not only in case of abusive lawsuits. Besides, taking the 
previous mentioned negative aspects into account, it is conceivable that these 
losses should be compensated as well. No matter how, the legislator should 
clarify the scope of the provision in more detail in order to provide at least a 
certain level of harmonization in this matter. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the directive now requires in Article 6 (2) 
subparagraph 2 that the sanctions in question shall be determined in a separate 
proceeding. This clause was added in the current draft and resolves the original 
concerns by several authors on the question how a court should decide whether 
the applicant acted in bad faith pursuant to Article 6 (2) in an infringement 
proceeding without just simply dismissing the case when it is already 
unfounded.80  
Taking all the aspects into account, the European legislator should evaluate the 
necessity of the provision at hand. In case he approves this approach, he 
should definitely clarify the provision in further detail regarding the type of 
sanctions, including the possible extend in case of financial compensation.  
 
3.4.3. Limitation period - Article 7 
The draft directive provides in Article 7 a temporal limitation for civil actions in 
case of a trade secret infringement to a period of three years. According to  
Article 7 (1), the application of measures, procedures and remedies provided in 
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 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 43.  
79
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 456. 
80
 In this regard, see the concerns by Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, 
Para. 42.  
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the directive must be brought within three years after the date on which the 
applicant became aware of the last fact giving rise to the action or at least had 
reason to become aware of it.  
Following this, it noteworthy that the limitation period was increased by the 
Parliament, presumably, because of to the reoccurring critics in the last 
months.81 Another change affects the newly added subparagraph 2 which 
clarifies that the Member States are free to determine the applying rules 
regarding the suspension and interruption of the limitation period. Taking this 
last aspect into account, it can be questioned whether the decision to leave the 
determination of the suspension and interruption up to the Member States may 
not contradict the overall aim of the directive to provide a sufficient level of 
harmonization in the Member States. Apparently, the great deviations regarding 
the limitation period in the Member States led the European legislator to the 
incorporation of a corresponding provision.82 Thereby, it seems to be more 
consistent to regulate all aspects regarding the limitation period in Article 7.   
Another issue concerns the reference to the criterion of having "awareness of 
the last fact giving rise to an action" in order to define the beginning of the 
limitation period. According to several authors, the criterion does not sufficiently 
provide an answer when the limitation period begins in cases of continuing 
actions. Such actions are typical in cases of an unlawful use of trade secret 
where the information in question is used in different stages, such as 
production, marketing, etc. or the action occurs over a certain period.83 Taking 
this into account, it should be clarified that the competent courts need to assess 
if the continuous actions are closely connected or constitute separate actions, 
whereby in case of the latter the limitation period needs to be assessed for each 
action separately.84  
Further concerns affect the element of "having reason to become aware" in 
order to define the beginning of the limitation period. The directive leaves it 
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 See inter alia the demand for a period of three years by Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the 
Max Planck Institute, Para. 45 and 47.  
82
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 456. 
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 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 46.  
84
 It seems to be sufficient that this is clarified in the recitals, because the above-mentioned 
criterion of “awareness of the last fact giving rise to an action” does at least not deny such 
interpretation.   
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unclear which degree must be accomplished in order to constitute such reason 
and also if this criterion includes all forms of negligence. Those questions seem 
to be critical especially in cases of trade secrets infringements where a reason 
to become aware might be easily given, however, the gathering of information 
and evidence might be very difficult and time-consuming.85 Thereby, it should 
be clarified that a reason to become aware requires a level of knowledge which 
would allow the application of legal proceedings.86 Regarding the 
implementation of a fault element, it would be recommendable to amend the 
wording corresponding to section 199 Para. 1 of the German Civil Code 
(BGB).87  
Despite the above-mentioned concerns, the introduction of a limitation period 
constitutes an exceptional case in the legislative history of the European Union. 
Depending on the reactions by the Member States and the effect on the legal 
protection, the current proposal might be a starting point for further 
developments in this area. 
 
3.4.4. Preservation of confidentiality in the course of legal 
proceedings - Article 8 
Article 8 contains detailed rules regarding the protection of confidentiality of 
trade secrets in legal - interim and main - proceedings. While paragraph 1 lays 
down a general obligation to ensure that trade secrets are not used or disclosed 
by the involved persons during and after an infringement proceeding, paragraph 
2 stipulates a non-exhaustive catalogue88 of specific measures how to preserve 
the confidentiality in the course of such procedure.  
The importance of this provision results from the fact that confidentiality is an 
essential element in trade secret infringement proceedings. Without appropriate 
measures the secrecy of a trade secret could be lost by the mere act of filing 
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 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 456.  
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 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P. 456. 
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 This provision requires that the obligee obtains knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to 
the claim and of the identity of the obligor, or would have obtained such knowledge if he had not 
shown gross negligence. 
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 See the wording of Para. 2, which states that “the measures […] shall at least include the 
possibility…". 
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the lawsuit, leading to the dismissal of all claims that are based on the violation 
of a trade secret.89 Thereby, it is conceivable that missing rules on the 
confidentiality of trade secrets in court proceedings can constitute barriers for 
the protection and enforcement of trade secret rights. Taking this into account, 
the provision can be regarded as one of the core elements in the draft directive.  
 
3.4.4.1. General obligation to preserve confidentiality 
According to Article 8 (1) subparagraph 1, Member States are obliged to ensure 
that persons who are participating in legal proceedings relating to a trade secret 
infringement or who are having access to documents which form part of those 
proceedings shall not be permitted to use or disclose those information if the 
competent judicial authorities have identified the information as confidential. 
This obligation covers the parties, their legal representatives and lawyers as 
well as court officials, witnesses, experts and any other person involved.  
Due to the open wording of the provision it is ensured that even initiating 
submissions are covered by the obligation.90 This enables the trade secret 
holder to protect the confidentiality of his or her trade secret right from the start 
of a legal procedure. As it was mentioned before, this is a significant element, 
because otherwise the secrecy of a trade secret could be compromised right 
from the beginning of a legal procedure. 
Regarding the adopting of appropriate measures, Article 8 (1) requires a “duly-
reasoned” application by the interested party. Besides, the judicial authority can 
also apply appropriate measures on their own initiative.91 The last clause was 
added in the recent proposal by the Parliament, presumably, to ensure the 
confidentiality in cases where the trade secret holder forgot to apply for 
appropriate measures or did not even recognize the confidential character of his 
or her information. Even though the rational of this clause is welcomed, it also 
causes further questions. For instance, it can be asked whether the provision 
constitutes an obligation for the competent court to adopt measures. If this 
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 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 47. 
90
 Cf. Kalbfus/Harte-Bavendamm, GRUR 2014, P.456. 
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 See Article 8 (1), last sentence of subparagraph 1. 
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would be the case, it could be asked whether this can cause a liability of the 
competent court or state in case that appropriate measures were not adopted. 
The draft directive does not lay down any guidance in this matter. However, 
following the general principle of party disposition in civil procedures, the parties 
exercise - in principle - the sole control over legal proceedings. Thereby, a 
liability of the state or court seems to contradict with this principle and, thus, 
should be excluded in the draft.  
 
3.4.4.2. Cease of effect  
The second subparagraph of Article 8 (1) clarifies that the above-described 
obligation shall remain in force after the end of proceeding. However, it also 
enables to cease an adopted confidentiality measure if a final decision finds that 
the alleged trade secret does not to fulfill the requirements set out in Article 2 
(1) or where the information in question becomes over the time generally known 
among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with 
that kind of information.  
The rationale behind the provision seems to be that it would not be justified to 
keep up an existing confidentiality measure against a respondent in case that 
the original subject of protection lapsed and no need for ensuring the 
confidentiality is required anymore. This might be even more important in a 
commercial context, where competitors of a former infringer will be free to use 
the information in question in case the trade secret protection lapsed, whereby 
the infringer would still be restricted under a confidentiality order. The provision 
at hand allows to avoid such (economic) disadvantages.  
 
3.4.4.3. Specific measures 
Pursuant to Article 8 (2), judicial authorities may take specific measures that are 
necessary to preserve the confidentiality of any trade secret or alleged trade 
secret used or referred to in the course of the legal proceedings relating to a 
trade secret infringement. Following this, the provision stipulates in 
31 
 
subparagraph 2 a non-exhaustive catalogue of measures in order to preserve 
the required confidentiality in legal proceedings. Equally to paragraph 1, this 
requires a duly-reasoned application by a party or the own initiative by the court. 
The measures enlisted in subparagraph 2 include at least the possibility to 
restrict the access to any document containing a trade secret or alleged trade 
secret and submitted by the parties or third parties to a limited number of 
persons in whole or in part (lit. a) as well as the access to hearings and their 
corresponding records or transcripts to a limited number of persons, when trade 
secrets or alleged trade secrets may be disclosed (lit. b). In both cases, the 
provision demands that at least one person from each of the parties and, where 
appropriate in view of the proceedings, their respective lawyers are given full 
access to the document. Finally, subparagraph 2 also includes the possibility to 
make available to third parties a non-confidential version of any judicial 
decision, in which the passages containing information defined as trade secrets 
have been removed or redacted (lit. c).  
One of the most significant changes in the current draft concerns the restriction 
of access to documents and hearings. The new draft by the Parliament requires 
– in contrast to the original draft by the Commission – that at least one person 
from each party should be given full access.92 Taking this into account, it can be 
questioned whether this approach is still in accordance with the aim of the 
directive. In particular, Recital 14 stipulates that the directive aims at protecting 
the confidentiality of litigated trade secrets. However, the directive recognizes in 
Recital 14 also the principle of fair trial. Clearly, the current approach 
recognizes the right of the involved parties for a fair trial and fair hearings in 
more detail than the original draft by the Commission. However, even though 
these principle are important constitutional safeguards, the current draft seems 
to overplay the importance of these principles at the expense of the protection 
of the trade secret holders. Following the current proposal, it is thinkable that 
trade secret holders would rather refrain from bringing legal actions because of 
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 Cf. Article 8 (2) of the Commission draft. While lit. b) allows in exceptional circumstances, and 
subject to appropriate justification, that the competent judicial authorities may restrict the 
parties’ access to hearings and order them to be carried out only in the presence of the legal 
representatives of the parties and authorized experts, lit. a) does not contain any exemption in 
favor of the other party or their legal representative. 
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the possibility to lose their trade secret even if only one person of the other 
party has access to it.  
Taking this into account, the European legislator should revise the chosen 
approach. In this regard, a possible solution could be to give only the lawyers of 
the other party full access to documents and hearings, whereby the party itself 
or at least one person of the party would get access only in appropriate or 
strictly necessary cases. In every case, it should also be clarified that those 
persons would be subject to the confidentiality obligation referred to in 
paragraph 1. This should be applied even in case that the proposal decides to 
stay with the current approach. 
  
3.4.4.4. Interim conclusion  
All in all, the provision provides a good starting point to preserve the 
confidentiality in legal proceedings. Due to the fact that the European legislator 
decided to not provide detailed but rather general obligations in order to ensure 
the confidentiality, it will be up to the Member States to define specific solutions 
when they implement the required measures into their national framework. This 
approach may set out the risk to not provide a fully harmonized legal 
framework. However, it allows a flexible way to implement the draft directive in 
accordance with the national frameworks of the Member States. In this regard, 
further discussions will surely concern the question which specific measures, 
despite those listed in Article 8 (2), will be implemented by the Member States 
in order to preserve the confidentiality properly and whether those measures will 
be still in compliance with the aims of the directive, to preserve the 
confidentiality of trade secrets on one side and the rights of fair trial and fair 
hearing on the other side.  
 
3.4.5. Provisional and precautionary measures - Article 9 
Article 9 of the draft directive provides provisional and precautionary measures 
in case of a trade secret infringement. 
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3.4.5.1. Included measures 
Paragraph 1 of the provision lists several measures that may be ordered by the 
judicial authority against the alleged infringer at the request of the trade secret 
holder. Those measures include the cessation or the prohibition of the use or 
disclosure of a trade secret (lit. a), the prohibition to produce, offer, place on the 
market or use of infringing goods as well as their import, export or storing for 
those purposes (lit. b), the seizure up or delivery of suspected infringing goods, 
including imported goods, in order to prevent their entry into or circulation within 
the market (lit. c).  
The named measures give the trade secret holder the opportunity to prevent or 
stop an infringement of his trade secret on an interim basis. This is an important 
aspect in the protection of trade secrets, because otherwise the confidentiality 
of the information in question would be in constant danger if the infringing act 
continues. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that Article 15 enables judicial 
authorities to impose sanctions in case that a party, who is subject to one of the 
measures referred to in Article 9 (1), fails or refuses to comply with those 
measures. In this case, the provision explicitly stipulates that non-compliance 
shall be subject to a recurring penalty payment if provided by national law.93 
 
3.4.5.2. Continuation of conduct 
Alternatively to the measures laid down in Article 9 (1), paragraph 2 allows the 
judicial authorities to make the continuation of an alleged unlawful acquisition or 
use of a trade secret subject to the lodging of guarantees. These securities 
must be intended to ensure the compensation of the trade secret holder. In 
contrast to the original draft, the new proposal by the Parliament requires also 
that the disclosure of a trade secret shall not be allowed against the lodging of 
guarantees.94  
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 Cf. Knaak/Kur/Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, Para. 48 who come to the 
conclusion that the (Commission draft) directive does not contain corresponding sanctions in 
order to accomplish the compliance of the affected respondent. Against such conclusion speaks 
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 Sentence 2 of Article 9 (2). 
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Following this, the provision gives an alleged infringer the possibility to continue 
his allegedly infringing conduct against the deposing of appropriate securities 
for the trade secret holder.95 In general, this mechanism is not unlikely in interim 
measures. The Enforcement Directive provides in Articles 9 (1) lit. a) similar 
rules in case of an alleged violation of intellectual properties. However, the 
question arises whether this is also justified in trade secret infringements. Even 
though the guarantee shall be intended to compensate the trade secret holder, 
it seems more likely that the confidential nature of trade secrets contradict with 
this mechanism. In contrast to intellectual properties, trade secret are 
dependent to remain secret. Thus, this secret nature would be endangered if 
the further use of the information is allowed.96 Even though the disclosure of 
such trade secret was excluded in the amended version of the Parliament (see 
above), it is probable that the secret nature can still be jeopardized in case that 
the court permits the further use. Following this, it seems appropriate to remove 
Article 9 (2) completely. The interests of all involved parties, especially those of 
the respondent, can be adequately ensured by simply applying the conditions 
and safeguards set out in Article 10.97 This would comprise, inter alia, the 
possibility by the court to order the applicant of such measures to lodge 
securities in order to compensate the alleged infringer.98  
 
3.4.6. Conditions of application and safeguards - Article 10  
Following the provision of interim measures in Article 9, Article 10 specifies the 
conditions and safeguards of those applicable measures. Due to interim 
character of those measures laid down in Article 9, the legislator decided to 
incorporated corresponding protective provisions. 
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 Ibidem. 
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 Cf. Article 10 (4). 
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3.4.6.1. Provision of available evidence 
In this respect, Article 10 (1) lays down that the judicial authorities have the 
authority to require the applicant to provide evidence that may reasonably be 
considered available in order to satisfy themselves with a sufficient degree of 
certainty, that a trade secret exists, that the applicant is the legitimate trade 
secret holder and that the trade secret has been infringed or a violation is at 
least imminent.  
The provision is similar to Article 9 (3) of the Enforcement Directive, which 
requires available evidence to be presented by the applicant. This is contributed 
to the expedited character of interim proceedings, where a fast evaluation of 
evidence is necessary in order to provide a decision in time. However, it can be 
noted that the directive does not clarify what types of evidence do fall under the 
scope of the provision. Therefore, it will be up to the Member States to 
determine the applicable types of evidence in interim proceedings, allowing 
them for instance to cover their traditional types of proof according to their 
national law.99 
Another issue concerns the requirement of a “sufficient degree of certainty”. The 
directive does not provide when such degree shall be accomplished. In contrast 
to Article 12 of the draft directive, which covers the conditions of measures 
resulting from a final decision, the wording of Article 10 (2) explicitly mentions 
this requirement. Taking this and the urgent character of interim proceedings 
into account, it can be assumed that Article 10 (2) requires a specific, reduced 
degree of proof in order to satisfy the burden of proof. In order to avoid legal 
uncertainties and to provide an adequate harmonization in the Member States, 
the draft should still clarify this aspect. Corresponding to the requirements in a 
German civil interim procedure, it could be stated that such a sufficient degree 
is reached when the court considers the applicant's submission predominantly 
true.100 
 
                                                          
99
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3.4.6.2. Assessment of proportionality 
Article 10 (2) requires the judicial authority to take into account the specific 
circumstances of the case in order to assess the proportionality of the measures 
in question. The assessment includes different aspects, such as the value of the 
trade secret, the measures taken to protect the trade secret, other specific 
features of the trade secret, the conduct - intentional or unintentional - of the 
respondent. Besides, the regulation also requires to respect legitimate interests 
of third parties, the public interest and the safeguard of fundamental rights.  
In general, the proportionality of a measure is not unlikely in the context of 
interim proceedings.  For instance, the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) 
recognizes the principle of proportionality in interim procedures in section 938 
as well.101 However, it seems unusual that the assessment includes third party 
and public interests. Taken the contradictorily character of a civil procedure, it is 
more likely that only the interests of the involved parties should be balanced 
with each other.  
 
3.4.6.3. Cease of effect, securities and compensation  
Paragraphs 3 to 5 of Article 10 provide additional safeguards in favor of the 
respondent of interim measures.  
Similar to Article 8 (1) of the draft directive, Article 10 (3) lays down several 
cases when the provisional measures referred to in Article 9 can cease to have 
effect upon a request of the respondent. This shall be the case when the 
applicant does not institute proceedings leading to a final decision of the case 
within a certain time (lit. a)102 or the information in question does no longer fulfill 
the requirements of a trade secret, laid down in Article 2 (1), for reasons that 
cannot be attributed to the respondent (lit. b). The existence of the provision is 
reasonable and contributed to the specific circumstances in interim 
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proceedings. These comprise the summary evaluation of evidence as well as 
the prevention to create a fait accompli prior to a final judicial clarification.  
Article 10 (4) enables the competent judicial authorities to make the provisional 
measures laid down in Article 9 subject to the lodging of adequate securities by 
the applicant in order to compensate the respondent or any other person 
affected by those measures for any prejudice suffered. The draft directive does 
not provide any guidance when the lodging should be taken into consideration 
by the court. Thereby, it will be up to the Member States or the national courts 
to create corresponding guidelines or to refer to existing legal traditions. Yet 
unclear is the inclusion of "any other person" into the scope of the provision. In 
this regard, the wording is too broad because it could require the court to take 
into consideration multiple persons when setting the amount of the securities. 
Following the contradictorily character of a civil proceeding, the security should 
only compensate the respondent of such measure. Any other person that could 
suffer damages from those measures should be excluded from the provision 
and referred to the general civil or tort law in order to claim compensation.  
Lastly, Article 10 (5) allows an injured respondent or third party to apply for 
compensation for any injury caused by the provisional measures if they are 
revoked because the applicant does not institute proceedings leading to a final 
decision within a certain time,103 the measures lapse due to any act or omission 
by the applicant, or where it is subsequently found that there has been no trade 
secret infringement. Similar to the above-mentioned concerns, the provision 
also covers third parties. In favor of such approach may speak that in practice 
also third parties can be affected and suffer damages by an ordered measures, 
for example in case that a third cannot re-sale alleged infringing goods due to 
the seizure or prohibition to sell against the respondent. However, as this 
example shows are these kind of damages only based on indirect injuries. 
Thereby, it must be asked whether indirect damages by third parties should be 
recoverable under the strict liability of Article 10 (5).104 Against such an 
approach speaks that the applicant of interim measures could face a boundless 
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liability. This problem is even enhanced by the fact that the directive does not 
provide any limitation regarding the personal scope of the liability regime of 
Article 10 (5), but rather covers any injured third party. Taking this into account, 
it is conceivable that such a broad liability could have a deterring effect on trade 
secret holders to apply for measures in legal proceedings. This again would 
evidently contradict with the aim of the draft directive to remove obstacles for 
the protection of trade secrets. Thus, third parties should be deleted from the 
strict liability regime in Article 10 (5). 
 
3.4.6.4. Element of urgency and adoption of measures 
without consultation 
Despite the above-mentioned aspects, the provision also misses to cover 
certain aspects. In general, interim measures require an element of urgency in 
order to justify the reduced examination requirements regarding the granting of 
relevant measures.105 The draft directive does not include such a requirement, 
nor does it clarify that the urgency is in case of a trade secret infringement 
presumed. Thereby, the draft directive should either incorporate a 
corresponding element of urgency or implement a corresponding presumption 
for the case that a trade secret is unlawfully acquired, used or disclosed.106 
Another missing aspect concerns the possibility to order an interim measure 
without an oral hearing and consultation of the respondent. Article 9 (4) of the 
Enforcement Directive provides such procedure in case that any delay would 
cause irreparable harm to the rightholder. Such a provision seems to be even 
more essential in trade secret cases. Due to the fact that the continuing use or 
disclosure of an information can lead to the loss of secrecy and thereby the 
legal protection, trade secret holders have a great interest in having effective 
measures against the violation of their trade secret. However, this efficiency is 
ensured most likey if the measures can be ordered without the knowledge of the 
infringer. Otherwise, the infringer could even facilitate the use or disclosure and 
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thereby endanger the loss of confidentiality even more. Taking this into 
consideration, it is convincing that the directive should supplemented a 
regulation that allows the stop or prevention of an infringement without the 
previous knowledge of the opponent party.  
 
3.4.7. Measures resulting from a final decision - Article 11 
In case a final decision is taken that finds a trade secret infringement, Article 11 
provides trade secret holders with injunctions and corrective measures against 
the infringer in question. The provision stipulates the complement to Article 9, 
which incorporates measures in case of interim proceedings. 
The measures laid down in Article 11 (1) lit. a) and b) are similar to those 
regulated in Article 9 (1) lit. a) and b).107 In addition, Article 11 (1) provides 
further measures which are not incorporated into Article 9. This includes the 
possibility of corrective measures (lit. c) and the destruction of all or part of any 
physical and/or electronic media containing or implementing the trade secret or, 
where appropriate, the delivery to the applicant (lit. ca).108 The corrective 
measures are regulated in more detail in paragraph 2 of Article 11. These 
comprise the recall of infringing goods (lit. b), the depriving of infringing goods 
from their infringing quality (lit. c) and the destruction of the infringing goods or, 
where appropriate, their withdrawl from the market, provided that such an action 
does not undermine the protection of the trade secret in question (lit. d). 
Another corrective measure is the destruction of all or part of any document, 
object, material, substance or electronic file containing or implementing the 
trade secret or, where appropriate, the delivery up to the trade secret holder of 
the named things (lit. e).  
 
3.4.7.1. General remarks 
As the wording indicates, the trade secret holder can apply for "one or more" of 
the included measures. Thereby, the current draft clarifies - contrary to the 
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original draft - the possibility to apply for several measures at same time in 
order to provide sufficient protection. 
In contrast to the original draft by the Commission, the possibility to apply for a 
declaration of infringement (lit. f) was deleted. This may derive from the fact that 
the trade secrets directive provides in Article 14 the publication of a judicial 
decision, whereby a separate claim of the trade secret holder for a specific 
declaration would have been redundant.  
Regarding the new introduced Article 11 (1) lit. ca) which covers the destruction 
or delivery of physical or electronic media, it can be questioned whether this 
provision is placed systematically correct. The measures resemble the 
corrective measures laid down in Article 11 (2) lit. e). Thus, the amended 
measures should be incorporated in the catalogue of corrective measures.  
 
3.4.7.2. Delivery of goods  
Following the possibility of withdrawing infringing goods from the market, laid 
down in Article 11 (2) lit. b), Article 11 (3) subparagraph 1 allows the delivery of 
those goods up to the holder or to charitable organizations upon his or her 
request, provided that the judicial authority determines conditions which prevent 
the re-entry of the goods in question into the market.  
Taking into account that trade secret holders will most likely favor the complete 
removal of the infringing goods - by destroying the goods in question or 
delivering up to him - in order to prevent any further uncontrolled distribution, 
the practical relevance of the delivery to a charitable organization can be called 
into question. Although the provision obliges the judicial authority to provide 
specific conditions to avoid this issue, it might be doubtful whether trade secret 
holders will rely on this in practice.  
Regardless of this aspect, the proposal should still clarify that the delivery must 
be in compliance with the principle of proportionality. Article 11 (3) 
subparagraph 3 and Article 12 (1), which include safeguards for the application 
of the mentioned injunctions and corrective measures, do not apply directly to 
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the measure in Article 11 (3).109 As the infringer loses his property throughout 
the delivery of his or her goods and the directive does not contain any 
compensation, it should be at least clarified that the measure is subject to the 
safeguards in Article 12 (1).   
 
3.4.8. Conditions, safeguards and alternative measures - 
Article 12 
Article 12 stipulates further conditions and safeguards regarding the adoption of 
injunctions and corrective measures laid down in Article 11. This includes 
primarily the application of the principle of proportionality and the revocation of 
granted measures once the information in question cannot be regarded as a 
trade secret any longer. In this regard, the provision contains similar aspects as 
Article 10. However, unlike Article 10, Article 12 provides in paragraph 3 also 
alternative measures in form of pecuniary compensation.  
 
3.4.8.1. Conditions regarding the adoption of relevant 
measures  
Article 12 (1) requires a case-by-case evaluation of several criteria in order to 
assess the proportionality of the requested measures. The contained elements 
are equal to those laid down in Article 10 (2). Thereby, the above-mentioned 
remarks apply in the same matter.110  
In addition, Article 12 (1) lays down in subparagraph 2 that the competent 
authorities limit the length of duration of the measures referred to in Article 11 
(1) lit. a) to ensure that it is sufficient to eliminate any commercial or economic 
advantage that the infringer could have derived from the trade secret 
infringement in question and to avoid the creation of unjustified obstacles.111 
With regard to those obstacles, the provision names fair competition, innovation 
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 Cf. the wording of both provisions, which explicitly refers only to injunctions and corrective 
measures. 
110
 See Chapter 3.4.9.3. 
111
 Those measures include the cessation or prohibition of the use or disclosure of a trade 
secret. 
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and labor mobility. The provision has no correspondent in Article 10, which is 
reasonable due to the provisional character of the interim measures, and also 
no equivalent in the Enforcement Directive.  
The intention behind the provision seems to be to exclude too time-extensive 
prohibitions against the infringer of a trade secret. This decision is welcomed. 
Still, the current wording of the provisions seems to require that the length of 
duration must be limited every time a measure referred to in Article 11 (1) lit. a) 
is ordered. In this regard, the original draft by the Commission provided a 
clearer solution by stating that “when the competent authorities limit the duration 
of the measure […], such duration shall be sufficient to eliminate any 
commercial or economic advantage”. Taking this into consideration, the 
proposal should clarify that the judicial authorities “may limit the length of the 
duration”. 
 
3.4.8.2. Revocation of granted measures  
Article 12 (2) lays down that the measures referred to in Article 11 (1) lit. (a) and 
(b) are revoked or otherwise cease to have effect upon request of the 
respondent. Like Articles 8 (1) lit. a) and 10 (3) lit. b), this requires that the 
information in question no longer fulfils the conditions of Article 2 (1) for reasons 
that cannot be attributed directly or indirectly to the respondent. Due to the 
corresponding wording, the previous made remarks apply in the same manner. 
The only difference is that the cease of effect now concerns measures that are 
ordered in main proceedings which result in a final decision. This could lead to a 
situation where the requirements of Article 12 (3) might be fulfilled but normal 
legal remedies be already time-barred. In that case, the Member States will 
have to provide specific procedures to allow the revocation of a final decision 
without any temporal limitation in order to transpose the provision properly.  
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3.4.8.3. Alternative measure: pecuniary compensation  
Article 12 (3) provides the possibility of pecuniary compensation as an 
alternative to the injunctions and corrective measures laid down in the draft.  
Pursuant to this provision, the competent judicial authority may order such 
pecuniary compensation to the injured party in case that the measures provided 
for in Article 11 are being applied and all of the requirements laid down in lit. (a) 
to (c) are fulfilled. This includes that the person concerned at the time of use or 
disclosure neither knew nor had reason, under the circumstances, to know that 
the trade secret was obtained from another person who was using or disclosing 
the trade secret unlawfully (lit. a), the execution of the measures in question 
would cause that person disproportionate harm (lit. b) and the pecuniary 
compensation to the injured party appears reasonable satisfactory (lit. c). In 
case that the alternative measure is ordered instead of the cessation or 
prohibition laid down in Article 11 (1) lit. a) and b), subparagraph 2 of Article 12 
(3) allows to limit the extend of the pecuniary compensation.112 
Summarized, the provision enables a differentiated liability for those infringers 
who acquired a trade secret in good faith but only became aware at a later 
stage that the information in question was unlawfully obtained by another 
person before.113 This provision is welcomed, because it allows a more 
differentiating liability for those persons who acted in good faith. In this case, it 
is reasonable to avoid the application of injunctions or corrective measures, as 
these measures can be very harmful, for example by causing high costs or 
financial losses. In this context, it is also appreciated that the current proposal 
amended the wording to the effect that the initiation of such an alternative 
measure can be now ordered at the request of one of the parties. Taking the 
beneficial character behind this provision into account, it is only reasonable that 
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 Pursuant to Article 12 (3) subparagraph 2, the pecuniary compensation shall not exceed the 
amount of royalties or fees which would have been due, had the person requested authorization 
to use the trade secret in question, for the period of time for which use of the trade secret could 
have been prohibited. 
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the infringer is able to request the adoption of such alternative measure as 
well.114   
 
3.4.9. Damages - Article 13 
Article 13 of the draft directive allows the trade secret holder to claim damages 
from the infringer in case of the culpable violation of the trade secret.115  
 
3.4.9.1. Basic requirements 
According to Article 12 (1), the competent judicial authority can order the 
infringer, on the application of the injured party, to pay the trade secret holder 
damages appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered as a result of the unlawful 
acquisition, disclosure or use of a trade secret if the infringer knew or ought to 
have known that he or she was engaging in a trade secret violation.  
Taking this, the provision basically requires the infringement of a trade secret 
pursuant to Article 3 of the draft directive, the fault of the infringer and the 
suffering of damages by the trade secret holder as a result of the infringement. 
Regarding the element of fault, the wording of the draft covers intentional and 
negligent behavior of the infringing person, whereby Article 13 covers - due to 
the lack of differentiation - ordinary and gross negligence.  
In addition to the original draft by the Commission, the Parliament draft 
regulates now in Article 13 (1a) explicitly the liability of employees for damages. 
According to this provision, Member States can limit the liability of employees in 
accordance with their national laws and practices in case they acted without 
intent. This decision is also welcomed, because it allows the Member States to 
apply their national rules and traditions regarding the liability relief of 
employees.116  
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 Cf. Article 12 (3) of the Commission draft which enables only the applicant to request such 
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 A corresponding provision is laid down in Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive.  
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 For instance, see the liability-restricting principles of in-company damage compensation in 
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3.4.9.2. Determining of the remunerable damages 
Regarding the setting of the recoverable damages, Article 13 (2) subparagraph 
1 requires the competent judicial authority to take into account all appropriate 
factors. Pursuant to this provision, this comprises several factors, such as 
negative economic consequences, including lost profits, any unfair profits made 
by the infringer and non-economical factors such as the moral prejudice caused 
to the trade secret holder by the trade secret infringement. Alternatively, Article 
13 (2) subparagraph 2 allows the judicial authority, in appropriate cases, to set 
the damages as a lump sum on the basis of elements such as, at a minimum, 
the amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had 
requested authorization to use the trade secret in question.  
Taking this into account, the paragraph corresponds with the rules laid down in 
the Enforcement Directive.117 Equal to Article 13 (1) lit. a) of the Enforcement 
Directive, the provision covers lost profits of the trade secret holder, unfair 
profits made by the infringer and non-economical factors. However, despite the 
similarities between both legal frameworks, it must be questioned whether the 
current version of the draft is appropriate and in compliance with the rationale of 
the draft directive and the characteristics of trade secret and their infringements.  
 
3.4.9.2.1. Unfair Profits 
At first, the question arises whether unfair profits of the infringer should be 
recoverable under the regime of the trade secrets directive. The compensation 
of unfair profits in intellectual property cases results from the fact that the right 
holders often cannot number if and to which amount their property got damaged 
by an infringement.118 This derives, among other things, from the immaterial 
and ubiquitous character of intellectual properties. Under these circumstances, 
intellectual property laws grant the right holders the claim for unfair profits, even 
though this claim is not (primarily) focused on compensation of the right holder 
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 See Article 13 (1), subparagraph 2, lit. (a) and (b) of the Enforcement directive. Despite 
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but absorption of profits from the infringer as a kind of surrogate.119 Taking 
these aspects into account, it reasonable to apply them in the same manner to 
trade secret infringements. Trade secrets share significant elements with 
intellectual properties,120 so that trade secret holders face the same issues in 
proving their suffered losses in case of a violation of their trade secrets.  
Thereby, it is consistent to provide trade secret holders with the same rights as 
intellectual property right holders, including the claim for unfair profits. This is 
also in accordance with the aim of the draft directive. The draft explicitly states 
in Recital 11 that it aims to deter infringements of trade secrets. Thereby, the 
rationale of the draft also corresponds with the deterring effect of absorbing the 
unfair profits from the infringer.121   
 
3.4.9.2.2. Moral factors 
Another issue affects the incorporation and interpretation of moral factors. The 
draft directive does not clarify whether those factors include only immaterial 
damages and/or reputational damages resulting from a trade secret 
infringement.122 In case of the latter, those factors could be recognized as 
material damages or - in the wording of the draft directive - economic 
consequences. In the first case, the question would be whether the 
compensation of immaterial damages can be justified in the context of trade 
secret protection. This depends on whether trade secrets also constitute - 
similar to intellectual property rights - an outflow of the personality of the right 
holder.123 Taking into consideration that trade secret protection results from 
ensuring the confidential character of an information, the protection of 
personality seems to be excluded or at least secondary. Under these 
circumstances, the incorporation of immaterial factors would seem to be 
inconsistent. However, this approach is of course not fixed. Therefore, the 
European legislator should re-evaluate the protection of personality in the field 
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47 
 
of damages. In case that this is approved, this should be clarified in the 
proposal in more detail.  
 
3.4.9.2.3. Relation between different damage factors 
Coming to the conclusion that lost profits and unfair profits are recoverable, 
another issue affects the relation of the listed factors in Subparagraph 1. While 
the setting of a lump sum clearly functions as an alternative to those factors in 
subparagraph 1, the relationship between the different factors within 
subparagraph 1 is unclear, especially if the trade secret holder is entitled to 
claim unfair profits and lost profits cumulatively or just alternatively. Following 
this, the European legislator should clarify the wording or provide further 
guidance in the recitals.  
 
3.4.9.2.4. Setting of a lump sum 
Regarding the claim of a lump sum by the trade secret holder, the provision 
allows the setting in “appropriate cases”. The possibility of claiming a lump sum 
plays a significant role in intellectual property cases. This is contributed to the 
above-mentioned circumstances, whereby right holders often fail to number and 
prove their suffered losses. In case the infringer does not have any unfair 
profits, it is recognized in several jurisdictions of the Member States to grant the 
right holder of intellectual property compensation in form of a lump sum on the 
basis of hypothetically due royalties (so-called “license analogy”).124 As trade 
secret holders can face the same issues in numbering and proving their 
damages as, the application of a lump sum in the draft directive is consistent as 
well. 
According to the wording in paragraph 2, the courts are allowed to set the sum 
at a minimum of due royalties. This indicates that the courts can also set higher 
amounts. This is contributed to the different traditions in the Member States 
(especially with regards to intellectual property cases), whereby some countries 
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grant the simple amount of royalties, while others grant twice or even third the 
amount of due royalties.125 Due to the open wording, which gives the competent 
court a margin, the provision recognizes the different traditions in the Member 
States. Besides, it allows a flexible reaction to different cases, inter alia, in case 
of commercial or private infringement of trade secrets.126 In order to avoid too 
extensive royalties, a cap of the recoverable amount will most likely result from 
the general principle of proportionality, which is laid down as a general element 
in Articles 5 (2) lit. a) and 6 (1), lit. a).127  
 
3.4.9.3. Interim conclusion  
All in all, Article 13 of the draft directive provides a sufficient framework for the 
applicant to claim damages. Due to the essential parallels to rules laid down in 
the Enforcement Directive, a homogenous system for damage claims can be 
established in the European legal framework. However, the provision still lacks 
minor issues which should be clarified by the European legislator until the 
directive will entry in force.  
 
3.4.10. Publication of judicial decisions - Article 14 
Article 14 of the draft directive regulates the publication of judicial decisions 
referring to trade secret infringements. According to paragraph 1, the competent 
judicial authority may order, at the request of the applicant and at the expense 
of the infringer, appropriate measures for the dissemination of the information 
concerning the decision. This encases the publishing of the decision in full or in 
part in printed or electronic media, including the webpage of the infringer. As the 
wording indicates, the listed measures are not exclusive. Thereby, other 
measures are also conceivable like the publication of a press release which 
contains the necessary information.128 
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The aim behind the provision seems to be the deterrence of further 
infringements as well as the sensitization of the public.129 In addition, it 
strengthens the rights of applicants by giving him an enforceable right to publish 
the decision and the necessary information referring to the case.  
Contrary to the Enforcement Directive, Article 14 provides more detailed 
requirements regarding the order of such publication measures. For instance, 
the taken measures shall preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets as 
provided for in Article 8 of the draft directive.130 Furthermore, the competent 
judicial authorities need to assess whether a measure complies with the 
principle of proportionality. In this regard, the provision lays down in paragraph 
3 several aspects which need to be taken into account. Pursuant to this 
paragraph, this comprises the question whether the information on the infringer 
would allow the identification of a natural person and, if so, whether the 
publication of that information would be justified. In this regard, the criteria that 
shall be taken into consideration concern, in particular, the possible harm that 
such a measure may cause to the privacy and reputation of the infringer, his 
conduct and the likelihood of further unlawful use or disclosure of the trade 
secret by him.  
 
3.4.11. Sanctions - Article 15 
Article 15 requires the Member States to ensure that competent judicial 
authorities may impose sanctions on the parties, their legal representatives and 
any other person who fails or refuses to comply with any measure adopted 
pursuant to Articles 8, 9 and 11. In case of Articles 9 and 11, the draft requires 
the imposing of recurring penalty payments, provided that the national law of a 
Member State provides those sanctions. As it was already pointed out in 
chapter 3.4.8.2, the provision aims to ensure the compliance with the measures 
laid down in the above-mentioned provisions. Thereby, Article 15 can be 
regarded as a useful supplement to those provisions. 
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3.5. Missing aspects 
Despite the fact that the draft directive contains detailed substantive and 
procedural rules, the draft also lacks regulating certain aspects.  
 
3.5.1. Right to information and preservation of evidence 
One of these aspects affects the incorporation of claims for information and 
preserving of evidence.131  
The Enforcement Directive provides in Articles 6 to 8 detailed rules regarding 
the right of information and preserving of evidence in order to enable the right 
holders of intellectual properties to enforce their rights efficiently. In this regard, 
the rights laid down in the Enforcement Directive supplement the right holder to 
get access to the necessary information from the opponent party and preserve 
them from being destroyed or getting lost. Thereby, it is assured that the “main” 
claims of a rights holder resulting from an infringement, for example applying for 
injunctions or claiming damages, can be substantiated in a legal proceeding 
with reasonable evidence. Without supplementary claims, the enforcement of 
rights in a legal proceeding could be jeopardized.  
The same aspects apply in trade secret cases as well. According to Harte-
Bavendamm, the access to as well as the preservation of information and 
evidence are essential in the field of trade secret protection.132 Thereby, the 
provision of appropriate rules is recommendable. Nevertheless, these 
provisions would need to respect the specific features of trade secret 
protection.133 In this regard, Kalbfus states that the right to information and to 
preserve evidence are primarily focused on the reconstruction of information 
flows in order to find out who acquired, used or disclosed the trade secret.134 
Thus, not only information about distribution channels, quantities or prices of 
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infringing goods are necessary but also names of persons that might be 
involved in the infringement.  
The incorporation in the draft directive is also preferable because it would allow 
to establish harmonized rules in the Member States. Even though the national 
laws may already provide certain rules in this behalf, it seems consistent to 
stipulate a uniform regulation in order to avoid or reduce legal diversities.135 
Furthermore, it would allow the European legislator to lay down appropriate 
safeguards and conditions, such as the recognition of the principle of 
proportionality, protection of confidentiality and prohibition of misuse.136  
 
3.5.2. Relationship to the Enforcement Directive 
Another point concerns the question in which relation the draft directive stands 
to the Enforcement Directive, especially to which extend the rules of the 
Enforcement directive can be applied if the draft directive does not provide any 
appropriate rules.  
Recital 28 of the draft directive states that the measures adopted to protect 
trade secrets should not affect any other relevant law in other areas including 
intellectual property law. However, where the scope of application of the 
Enforcement Directive and the current proposal overlap, the trade secrets 
directive shall take precedence as lex specialis.  
Following this wording, the recital is rather misleading. Article 1 of the 
Enforcement directive mentions that the respective directive provides rules for 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Thus, the first sentence of recital 
28 in the draft directive rather precludes the application the Enforcement 
Directive in general due to its application to intellectual property rights. Another 
conclusion would be conceivable if one assumes that sentence 2 of Recital 28 
constitutes an exemption from the exclusion of intellectual property rights in 
favor of the Enforcement Directive so that the directive would be applicable to 
the protection of trade secrets if the draft directive does not provide adequate 
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provisions in a specific context.137 This interpretation seems consistent due to 
the great structural parallels between the Enforcement Directive and the trade 
secrets draft. However, it seems to be contradicted by Recital 10. This recital 
lays down that the provisions of the draft directive should not create any 
exclusive right. According to several authors, this indicates that the directive 
recognizes trade secrets rather as a part of unfair competition law than as 
intellectual property.138 Taking this into consideration, it could be assumed that 
the trade secrets directive does not overlap with the Enforcement directive due 
to the application in different areas of law. Following this discourse, the draft 
directive should clarify in Recital 28 the application of the Enforcement Directive 
in further detail.  
As the foregoing discussion has shown, it would be also desirable to regulate 
the legal status of trade secrets in a more clear way. This would not only help to 
clarify the application of the Enforcement Directive but also the application of 
Articles 6 or 8 of the Rome II regulation.139   
 
3.5.3. Level of harmonization 
Another issue affects the question which level of harmonization the proposed 
directive stipulates. The draft directive does not provide a clear solution in this 
matter. Thereby, it is not clear whether the directive aims at establishing a 
concept of full harmonization, which excludes stricter rules by the Member 
States, or minimum harmonization, which would allow the Member States to 
establish stricter rules where admitted.140 This should be amended in the 
recitals or Article 1 in order to provide sufficient clarification for the Member 
States in case that the directive will be transposed. 
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4. Conclusion 
Taking the foregoing analysis into consideration, the current draft directive 
provides a well-balanced solution for the protection of trade secrets. Due to the 
additional amendments provided by the Legal Affairs Committee in the current 
version of the draft directive, the proposal contains further conditions and 
safeguards which are essential for such a balance as well as clarifications in 
order to provide a better understanding of the directive.  
The alignment to the Enforcement Directive in chapter 3 allows a coherent 
protection of trade secrets and intellectual properties. Another benefit of the 
current proposal is established through the substantive provisions laid down in 
chapter 1 and 2. The incorporated definitions for several key terms enable a 
concrete application of the remedies, measures and procedures laid down in 
chapter 3 and thereby allow an efficient and harmonized level of protection. 
Despite those positive effects, this thesis has also shown that the draft directive 
still offers room for several improvements. This is contributed, inter alia, to the 
use of open clauses and the lack of sufficient clarifications in the directive. Even 
though these clauses provide a flexible approach for the Member States and 
competent courts, the directive should provide further guidance and 
clarifications in order to ensure that the objectives pursued by the directive are 
achieved properly. This could avoid possible preliminary rulings by the CJEU in 
the future and at the same facilitate the application of the draft directive.  
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